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An Alternative Unifying  Unlike  the traditional measure
of welfare gains from risk-
Measure of Welfare Gains  sharing, the new measure
from  Risk-Sharing  presented  here  does  not
depend  on  the  horizon,  and
it is robust to aiternative
Philippe  Auffret  specifications  of the
consumption stochastic
processes  and  preferences.
This measure  shows  that if
international risk-sharing
eliminates  volatility  in
aggregate consumption and
leads  to greater  consumption
growth,  risk-sharing  can  have
a sizable  impact  on  consumer
welfare.
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Summary findings
Following Lucas's (1987) standard approach, welfare  preferences to Kreps-Porteus preferences). The author
gains from international risk-sharing have been measured  then uses this measure to estimate potential welfare gains
as the percentage increase in consumption levels that  from international risk-sharing for a representative U.S.
leaves individuals indifferent between autarky and risk-  consumer.
sharing. Auffret proposes to measure welfare gains as the  Auffret finds that if international risk-sharing leads
increase in consumption growth instead of consumption  only to a complete elimination of aggregate consumption
levels. When the consumption process is nonstationary,  volatility (with no impact on consumption growth), it
Auffret's proposed measure has several attractive  represents gains to a U.S. consumer of only $12 a year
features: it does not depend on the horizon, and it is  on average. But if international risk-sharing also permits
robust to alternative specifications of the consumption  an increase in consumption growth, it may have a sizable
stochastic processes (from geometric Brownian processes  impact on welfare. Each 0.5 percentage point increase in
to Orstein-Ulhenbeck mean-reverting processes) and  consumption growth represents gains to a U.S. consumer
preferences (from constant relative risk aversion  of about $160 a year on average.
This paper-a  product of the Economic Policy Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is  part of a larger
effort in the region to analyze  the impact of catastrophic risks on welfare and determine whether the catastrophic insurance
function can serve a key developmental role in disaster prone countries. Copies of the paper are available free from the
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Kevin Tomlinson, mail stop 14-403, telephone
202-473-9763,  fax 202-676-1494,  email address ktomlinson@aworldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted at pauffret@aworldbank.org. September
2001.  (23 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress  to  encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less  than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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How big are welfare gains from risksharing?  This question has received much interest in the
literature starting with Lucas'  (1987) seminal paper.  Indeed, if unexploited welfare gains from
risksharing  are  small,  then  small  imperfections  in  the  economy  would  suffice  to  prevent
risksharing  mechanisms to  develop  beyond existing  levels. However, the  presence  of  large
unexploited welfare gains would lead to the next question: Why do not risksharing mechanisms
develop further?  Answers to this question may have  important implications for public policy.
Indeed, if risksharing mechanisms remain incomplete in the presence of large unexploited welfare
gains, measures to facilitate their development could enhance economic welfare.
Numerous papers in the international economics literature have sought to derive the welfare gains
from international risksharing. To  do  so, papers  have followed Lucas'  (1987) approach and
measured welfare gains as the percentage increase in consumption, uniform across all dates and
states of the world that makes people indifferent between the existing stochastic consumption
path  and  that  which  would  result from  international risksharing. However, this  measure  of
welfare gains depends on a number of parameters including the discount rate and the time horizon
and is sensitive to alternative specifications of preferences and consumption stochastic processes.
Unsurprisingly, van Vincoop mentions that "the reported results varies enormously, ranging from
less than 0.1% to over 100%" (van Vincoop, 1999, p.110).
This paper has two objectives. The first is to propose an alternative measure of welfare gains
from  risksharing. Under this  alternative measure, gains from risksharing  are  defined  as  the
additional percentage points of consumption growth which make people indifferent between the
existing stochastic consumption path and that under risksharing. This  alternative measure has
several attractive features: it does not depend on the discount rate and the horizon, and is robust to
alternative specifications of preferences (from constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences
to Kreps-Porteus preferences) and stochastic processes (from geometric Brownian processes to
Orstein-Ulhenbeck  mean-reverting  processes)  for  consumption.  The  second  is  to  use  the
alternative measure  to  estimate potential  welfare  gains  from  international risksharing  for  a
representative US consumer. The main finding of the paper is that potential welfare gains from
risksharing are small if risksharing leads exclusively to a decrease in volatility but may become
substantial if risksharing results in an increase in consumption growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on
welfare  gains from  international risksharing.  Section 3  derives the  conventional measure  of
welfare  gains from risksharing as well  as the  proposed alternative measure under  alternative
stochastic processes and preferences. Section 4 evaluates the welfare gains from international
risksharing for a representative US consumer using the alternative measure. The final section
summarizes the main results and suggests directions for future research.
2. Literature on welfare gains
In his 1987 seminal paper, Lucas sought to assess the costs of economic fluctuations. Under the
assumption that  (log  of)  per-capita  consumption  follows  a  trend-stationary  process,  Lucas
evaluated the welfare gains that would result from a complete elimination of the variability of
aggregate consumption with no change in consumption growth for a representative US consumer.
Using aggregate consumption data, he found these costs to be less than one tenth of a percentage
point of expected consumption which seems "to be an extremely low estimate of the costs of
economic instability" (p. 27).  Lucas qualified his result. First, he acknowledged  that since setting
the objective of a complete elimination of all consumption variability does not result from an
3individual's optimization problem it may not be "a feasible or a desirable objective of policy" (p.
27). Second, he mentioned that eliminating the variability of aggregate consumption "cannot be
expected to eliminate more than a small part of the uninsurable risk borne at the individual level"
(p. 29).
Papers from the  international economics  literature have adapted Lucas'  method to  assess the
gains from international risksharing using two approaches.! A first approach based on a general
equilibrium framework, starts from the observation that the perfect risksharing hypothesis implies
that country-specific consumption growth should be perfectly correlated across countries while it
should be uncorrelated with country-specific income growth. However, these theoretical findings
are generally rejected in regression-based tests. 2 Whether the imperfect risksharing outcome is
surprising  or  not  depends  on  the  size of the  potential  gains from  international risksharing.
Consequently, consumption-based models have asked the question:  How much welfare gains can
be obtained from lowering country-specific consumption variance to the variance which would
result from sharing aggregate business cycle risks among countries? To derive the welfare gains
from  international  risksharing,  these  models  have  typically  assumed  that  country-specific
consumption paths follow exogenously given stochastic processes with identical means. A second
approach based on a partial equilibrium CAPM framework, starts from the observation that there
is a strong home bias in international stock and bond portfolios. 3 Papers based on a portfolio
approach have  sought to  assess how  much welfare  gains would result from maximizing the
expected utility of a portfolio made of country-specific securities that follow exogenously given
stochastic processes.  National stock market indices (Lewis, 1996) and  GDP-based securities
(Shiller, 1993; Shiller and Athanasoulis, 1997) have been typically taken as proxies for country-
specific securities. In these models, the welfare gains from diversification result from changes in
both the means and variance of the optimal portfolio compared to the currently held portfolio.
Gains from diversification have typically been estimated to be about 100 times larger under the
portfolio-based approach than under the consumption-based  approach. 4
To understand how changes in growth and variance of (per-capita) consumption translate into
measurements  of  welfare  gains, the  existing  literature has  followed  Lucas'  (1987)  standard
approach.  Welfare gains are measured as the percentage increase consumption (uniform across
all  dates and  states of the world) that  leaves individuals indifferent between autarky and  the
hypothetical economy whose consumption growth and variance result from risksharing. However,
while Lucas assumed that consumption followed a trend-stationary process, subsequent papers
have assumed that consumption followed non-stationary (unit-root) processes. 5 While empirically
it  is  hard  to  say  whether  consumption  is  stationary or  non-stationary,  theory tells  us  that
optimizing behavior leads to a random walk in consumption.  However, while the measure of
welfare gains proposed by Lucas depends on a few parameters when the consumption stochastic
process is stationary, this measure depends on and is sensitive to a large set of parameters once
the consumption  process  is assumed  to  be non-stationary. Numerous  papers  have  sought to
analyze the dependence of welfare gains on the specifications of such parameters including the
horizon  (van  Wincoop,  1999; Athanasoulis  and  van  Wincoop, 2000),  alternative  stochastic
processes (Obstfeld,  1994b; van Wincoop, 1999) and alternative preferences (Obstfeld,  1994b;
van Wincoop, 1994; 1999). Consequently, depending on the assumptions they have made, some
papers have reported small gains from international risk sharing (Lucas, 1987; Cole and Obstfeld,
' For a recent  survey,  see Lewis  (1996).
2 Lewis  (1999)  provides  a review  of this literature.
3 For a recent  paper which  documents  the home  bias  puzzle,  see Tesar  and Werner  (1998).
4 For a more  detailed  discussion,  see Lewis  (1999).
5  The only exception  we know is Obstfeld  (1994b)  which considers  both stationary  and non-stationary
processes).
41991;  Tesar;  1995)  while  others  (van  Wincoop,  1994,  1996;  Lewis,  1996;  Shiller  and
Athanasoulis, 1995 and Obstfeld, 1994b, 1995) report much larger welfare gains.  This has led to
widely different results which have led to considerable confusion over the true magnitude of the
welfare gains from international risksharing.
The strategy adopted in this paper is to provide an alternative unifying measure for evaluating the
welfare  gains  from  risksharing  which  only  depends  on  a  few  parameters  when  economic
uncertainties are generated by non-stationary stochastic processes. The basic intuition is that if
welfare gains measured as the percentage increase in consumption level, uniform across dates and
states,  depend  on  a  few parameters when the  exogenously assumed consumption  process  is
stationary (Lucas, 1987), measures of welfare gains measured as the percentage points increase in
consumption growth equally depend on a few parameters when the consumption process is non-
stationary. This alternative measure depends on a few parameters, does not depend on the horizon
and  is robust to  changes in the stochastic processes (from  geometric Brownian processes to
Orstein-Ulhenbeck mean-reverting processes) and alternative preferences (from constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) preferences to Kreps-Porteus preferences). Additionally, the paper shows
that  the  consumption-based  papers  that  have  assumed  a  non-stationary  process  (Cole  and
Obstfeld,  1991; Obstfeld,  1994a; van Wincoop, 1994; Tesar,  1995; Lewis, 1996) would have
derived more uniform welfare gains from risksharing had they used this alternative measure. As
such  the  alternative  measure  of  welfare  gains  unites  the  literature  on  welfare  gains  from
international risksharing.
3.  Welfare gains from risk sharing: Theory
3.1  Model
The  basic model used  in the paper is a  representative agent multi-country model where  the
dynamics  of (per-capita) consumption is described by an exogenously defined  diffusion-type
stochastic process. Consider a world economy consisting of N  countries with a representative
individual in each country. In making plans,  individuals take account of the welfare  of their
descendants with a horizon H. This intergenerational interaction is modeled by  assuming that
living individuals maximize expected utility over an horizon H that may exceed their lifetime. 6
Population follows a deterministic process with exogenous constant growth n.7 Individuals have
time-separable expected utility functions over a single tradable consumption good. It is assumed
that  a  representative  individual  has  a  utility  function  with  CRRA  preference  given  by
u(c)  =d  where  p >0  and  pA I  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion or  u(c) = Logc the
I-p
limiting case when  p = 1 8. The multiplication of u(c)  by the family size represents the adding up
of utils of all family members alive at time t. We define ,  as the rate of time preference (p > 0) .9
Expected utility at time 0 is
6 This setting  is appropriate  if altruistic  parents  provide  transfers  to their children,  who give in tum to their children.
The individual  with a finite horizon  that we model  corresponds  to finite-lived  individuals  who are connected  via a
pattern  of operative  intergenerational  transfers  that  are based  on altruism.
7 The  model  could  be expanded  to allow  for stochastic  population  growth.  See Merton,  1975.
8 The inclusion  of the term -1  in the formula  is convenient  because  it implies  that  u(c) approaches  Log(c) as  p -+  .
The term  -1/(1-p) can, however  be omitted  without  affecting  the subsequent  results  which are invariant  to linear
transformations  of the utility  function.
9  Kocherlakota  (1990)  argues  that  the time  discount  rate could  be negative.
5V = E 0,  (  C/l  -I  dt]  (1)
Per-capita consumption is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process (SPI) defined by
c,
where  c0 represents per-capita consumption at time  0 and the second term is the differential
representation for  the dynamics of  c, where  dZ = N (0,  dt)  is a  standard Wiener or Brownian
motion process with expectation and variance equal to 0 and dt respectively. We assume that both
,u and  a are constant. Under these assumptions, per-capita consumption follows  a  geometric
Brownian motion with drift.
Proposition 1.  When  (per-capita) consumption follows  the non-stationary stochastic process
(SP1), expected utility at time 0 is given by
V(c08,52  p  )=  Co  - e [  (  ]H  |  _e-(,6-n).H(2
~r(COAO.2pH)co  1____  (2)
(C""U'  H)I-p  fl-n+(p-l)-Si  I-p  8B-n
where ,u  l  - ,  p  a2
2
The propositions are proved in the appendix. F(ji,p)=  /3-n+(p-1)  i  acts like a discount rate
for  this  economy. We  assume  that  F(Z7,p)>O.  As  anticipated,  expected utility  at  time  0
increases  with  initial  consumptionco (  >0  Note  that  since  (a  >O  expected  utility
increases with ,u which implies that higher consumption growth (keeping variance constant) and
lower volatility (keeping growth constant) are associated with higher expected utility.
3.2  Welfare gains: definition
We want to assess the potential welfare gains of policies that affect both consumption growth and
variance. More specifically we assume that once these policies are implemented, consumption
follows the stochastic process (SP2)
c;  '.  dt  +  C '-  dZ  '  where dZ'= N(0, dt)'0 (SP2)
Define  ,i'= ,'-  2 p.ac 2 To ensure that expected utility improves under (SP2), we assume that
2
> ,u . We also assume that  F(gi  p) > 0 . Note that at this stage we are not asking whether
adopting policies which  modify the stochastic process is feasible or desirable. Neither  are we
asking which policies, if adopted, would lead to a change in the  stochastic process although,
consistent with the literature, we are implicitly assuming that these policies increase international
risk-sharing. We are simply focusing on the potential welfare changes that would correspond to a
change  in the  means and variance of the consumption stochastic process. Two  different  but
related definitions of welfare gains are proposed.
Definition 1: The measure p of welfare gains is implicitly  defined as
'° Note that  we do not impose  that  the Wiener  process dZ' be identical  to dZ .
6V ((I+ p)  coS,,u  a'  p  H) =V(CO"U,Sta2  p,H)  (3)
Under  this  definition  introduced  by  Lucas  (1987)  and  extensively  used  in  the  literature
afterwards,' l the measure p of welfare gains is the percentage increase in consumption at time 0
that  makes  individuals  indifferent  between the  existing  consumption  dynamics  defined  by
(u, a) and the consumption dynamics defined by(u',o-').  Equivalently, p  is such that individuals
are indifferent between
(I+p)  co;-d=u  dt+ a dZ  (SP3)  and  c0;-=d='.  dt+ a'.  dZ'  (SP2)
CI  Cf
where  first  terms  represent  consumption  at  time  0  and  second  terms  are  the  differential
representation  for  the  dynamics  of  c,.  Note  that  the  compensating  increase  in  current
consumption results in an increase in expected consumption in all dates and states of the world
given by
Vt  H  Eo  [c(j+P).c0u,a  (t)].  I +  (4)
E 0 [C(,P)CcOP  (t)]
where  cC.  ,,u,e(t)  and  c(I+p).CoPG,a(t)  represent per-capita consumption under  (SPI)  and (SP3)
respectively.  We propose to consider the following alternative measure of welfare gains.
Definition 2: The measure T of welfare gains is implicitly defined as:
V(Co,P+,ra2  p,H)  = V(cO,pI,f2,  p,H)  (5)
This measure of welfare  gains does not seem to have  been used in the  literature. It can be
interpreted as the additional percentage points of consumption growth which make individuals
indifferent  between  the  consumption  dynamics  defined  by(p +r,a-)  and  the  consumption
dynamics defined by  (u', a')  while keeping consumption c0 unchanged. Equivalently,  r is such
that individuals are indifferent between
dc  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~dc,
co;dc- =(u+r)*dt+a*dZ  (SP4)  and  c0;-=  u'. dt  +  a"  .dZ'  (SP2)
C,  C,
Note that
"  Recent papers that have used this definition include Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Lewis (1996), Obstfeld
(1994  a,b),  van  Wincoop  (1994,  1999).  Tesar  (1995)  uses  lifetime  consumption  instead  of  initial
consumption. Consequently, her measure of welfare gain is Pr =  p  . P . Since she takes H = 100,
this helps explain why the welfare gains she derives are about 100 times smaller than that reported in other
papers.
7Id<f  E0[I  C4z,f/+,r.a(0)  rt  (6
Eo [cco,p,a  (t)]_  (6)
Consequently, the compensating increase in the consumption growth rate represents the growth
rate of expected consumption in all states of nature.
The two definitions of welfare gains can be interpreted in terms of "willingness to pay". Under
this interpretation, p* represents the percentage decline in (per-capita) consumption at time 0 that
individuals are willing to pay to "benefit" from the stochastic process defined by  (u', a')  i.e. p  is
such that individuals are indifferent between
dc,  . dc,
co;-  =j  dt+  adZ  (SPI)  and  (I-p  ).co;-=p'%dt+a'.dZ'  (SP5)
It  can be  immediately  derived that  1-p=-which  impliesp  p*when  p  is  small  (p  0). 1+p
Similarly, r* can be interpreted as the decrease in percentage points of consumption growth that
individuals are willing to pay to "benefit" from the stochastic process defined by  (',u  ')  i.e. r  is
such that individuals are indifferent between
dc,  dc 0 f-L('  *.d+y.d  S
co;-=  udt+a  dZ  (SP1)  and  co;  (z'-r  dt+ a'  dZ'  (SP6)
Proposition 2. The welfare gains  r and p  of policies that modify the stochastic process followed
by consumption  from  (SP1) to (SP2) are given by
(7)
Log(l  + p)  =-  Lo_g  I  (8)
The measure r  of welfare gains only depends on the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the
growth and variance of the initial and final stochastic processes for consumption. However, the
measure  p  of welfare gains depends on the degree of risk aversion, the time horizon and the
discount rates. This outcome is not surprising. The additional percentage points of consumption
growth r  that leave individuals indifferent between the two stochastic processes do not depend
on  the  horizon. Consequently, the  conversion of extra  percentage points  of  growth  r into a
percentage  p of current consumption requires to know the discount rate and the time horizon in
addition to the stochastic parameters and the degree of aversion to risk
Using the previous relations, we now evidence the dependency of the measure p  of welfare gains
on the horizon and the parameters (,u',  ao') of the final consumption dynamics.
Proposition 3.  Given initial (SPI) and final  (SP2) stochastic processes for  consumption,  the
measure p  of welfare gains is an increasingfunction of the horizon H.
8As the horizon increases, the  stream of welfare benefits becomes larger which translates into
higher percentage-equivalent p  of current consumption. This outcome is consistent with previous
papers  (van  Wincoop,  1999;  Athanasoulis  and  van  Wincoop,  2000)  which  analyze  the
dependency of p  on the horizon. As the horizon becomes longer, the measure p  of welfare gains
monotonically increases to the asymptotic value p (H = o)  when horizon is infinite  (H = ao)  with
Log(l +  p (H =  )=  lLog[(  PI  (9)
Obsfeld (1  994b) derives a similar relation in a discrete time version of the model. Note that when
the  initial and  final discount  rates are  close  F(J,  p) 0 FF(T',  p) or  equivalentlyZi'D  l iand  the
horizon is infinite, the measure p of welfare gains becomes
p(H=  E) F(-,)  (10)
Consequently, at  infinite  horizon, the  measure  p of  welfare  gains  is  equal  to  the  measure
r divided by the discount rate.  In addition
d[Iog(1+p 8)]  I
dH  ~~~~2
Graph 1: Welfare gain and horizon
Proposition 4. Given an  initial stochastic process  (SPl) for  consumption, the measure  p of
welfare  gains  is an  increasingfunction  of ''.
This outcome  is not surprising. Higher growth (keeping variance constant) or lower variance
(keeping growth constant) of the final stochastic process translates into higher welfare gains in
terms of percentage of current consumption. Graph 2 illustrates this point.
Graph 2: Welfare gain and variance
In order to calibrate the model, it is useful to determine the implicit risk-free interest rate that
corresponds to  this  economy. Indeed,  as  evidenced in  the  empirical  section  of  the  paper,
differences between reported welfare gains across papers can largely be explained by the choice
of parameters that  allow for unrealistically large implicit risk-free interest rates.
Proposition 5: The implicit risk-free interest rate in this economy is constant and given by
R=)/3-n+p.  (z-  p-p  a)  P  .cr  (12)
The implicit risk-free rate is constant. It decreases as consumption volatility increases. A higher
consumption variance  a2  implies  that, other  things  equal, the  expected  marginal utility  of
consumption rises more rapidly over time. Note that this expression is consistent with Obstfeld
(1994b).' 2
12 However,  van Wincoop  (1994, 1999)  and  Athanasoulis  (2000)  refer  to  as the implicit  risk-
free interest  rate.
93.3 Alternative stochastic process
In this  section,  we derive  the two measures  r  and  p  of welfare  gains  under  alternative  stochastic
processes.  We  consider  the  cases  where  (per-capita)  consumption  follows  mean-reverting  and
stationary  processes.
3.3.1  Mean-reverting process
We consider  an alternative  stochastic  process  where  (log  of) per-capita  consumption  is assumed
to follow  a geometric  Ornstein-Uhlenbeck  process.
co;dt=  (  -y  Logc)  dt+a  dZ  with r > 0  (SP7)
c,
where  dZ = N (0, dt) is the  standard  Brownian  motion.  Logc  is  a  mean-reverting  process  such
that if  Logc>(  -22.a2)/y,  then  E,(dLogc)<0  and if Logc<(p-2.a2/,  then  E(dLogc)>O.  Note
that
,U_ I  a2  ,L-  I  C,2
Eo[Logct]=  r  +  Logeco-  2}e  (13)
In  this  section,  for  reasons  of  tractability,  we  assume  that  p =1  such  that  u(ct)  = Logc,  and
u-=  A-2  . We  also  assume  that  n = ,B.  A  special  case  is  when  population  remains
2
constant(n  =0) and  the  rate  of  time  preference  is  zero(fi  =  0).13  Under  these  assumptions,
expected  utility  at time  0 is
VYOU  =Eo[  Logce  -dtl  (14)
Proposition  6.  When  (per-capita)  consumption  follows  the  geometric  Ornstein-Uhlenbeck  (OU)
stochastic  process  (SP 7), expected  utility at time  0 is given  by




As  when  (per-capita)  consumption  follows  a  geometric  Brownian  motion  with  drift,  expected
utility  at  time  0  increases  with  initial  consumption  (a'ou  >0o)  and  ,ci (  &  > 0)  which  implies
that  higher  consumption  growth  and  lower  volatility  are  associated  with  higher  expected  utility.
13 Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995)  mention  that  Ramsey  (1928)  assumed  A=  0 and  interpreted  the
optimizing  agent as a social planner,  rather  than  a competitive  household  while  the discounting  of utility  for
future  generations  (o  > 0)  was,  according  to Ramsey,  "ethically  indefensible".  (Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin,
1995, p.61).
10Again, we want to assess the potential welfare gains of policies that affect both consumption
growth and variance.  We assume that these policies do not affect the mean-reverting coefficient.
More specifically we assume that once these policies are implemented, consumption follows the
stochastic process (SP8)
co;d=  ( u'- y  Logc,) dt +  a'. dZ'  where dZ'= N (O,  dt) and y > 0  (SP8)
c,
To ensure that expected utility improves under (SP8), we assume that fT>  ,.
Proposition 7. The welfare gains  rou  and  Pou  of policies that modify the stochastic process
followed  by consumption  from  (SP7) to (SP8) are given by
rou =  (16)
Lg( +Pou)=  - (l-  07  )  -ii)  (17)
Interestingly,  the  measure  rouof  welfare  gains  remains  identical  to  that  when  per-capita
consumption follows a  geometric Brownian motion with  drift  (rou = r) (Equation (6)  remains
valid when  p = I) while the measure  pou  under OU process differs from the measure  p  under
Brownian motion with drift (set ,  = n  in Equation (8)). Interestingly, the measure Pou  depends
on  the  mean-reverting coefficient  y.  It  can  also  be  checked  that  when  y = 0  (per-capita




which  can  be  obtained  from Equation  (8)  taking  the  limit  as  p -*1.  Graph  3  shows the
dependency  of the  measure  Pou  of  welfare  gains on  the  mean-reverting coefficient  using
Equation (16).
Graph 3:  Welfare gain and mean-reverting coefficient
Hence, to assume that (log of) consumption follows a Brownian motion with drift (y =0) whereas
the  true process  is  O-U  (y > 0),  leads to  undervalue the measure  p  of welfare  gains.  The
undervaluation  increase  withy.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  van  Wincoop  (1999)  who
discusses the role of alternative stochastic processes on gains from risk sharing using a discrete
time  approach. When  y  is  large  (yO  0),  the  measure of welfare gains under  O-U process
Pou (y OI  0) is related to that under Brownian motion with drift Pou  (r = 0) by
Pou (ry  '  0) =  pou  (y =  0) [2 +  pou (y =  0)]  (19)
3.3.2 Stationary process
11We turn to the case where (log of) per-capita consumption follows a trend stationary process.
co;Logc =  Logco+,u t+cr G(t)  (SP9)
where  G(0) =0 and  G(t) = N(O,l)  is distributed Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 1. This was
the stochastic process assumed by Lucas in his seminal 1987 paper (Lucas, 1987).
Proposition 8.  When (per-capita) consumption follows  the trend stationary stochastic process
(SP9), expected utility at time 0 is given by
__  [fl-n+(p-1)-#]H  1 (P_1)1-a21  _e-(P6n).H
sCo,  ,  Cyp  _  *  He 2 - (20)
VS  ( I-p  6-n+(p-1)-,uI-p  fl-n
F(p,p)=fl8-n+(p-1).p  acts  like  a  discount  rate  for  this  economy.  We  assume  that
F (u, p) > 0 . Consequently, when (per-capita) consumption follows a trend stationary stochastic
process,  expected utility at  time 0  increases with initial consumption  co  a 0 S  > 0  while  it
(ac 0
increases with,u  (p  4s  >o. However, expected utility decreases (resp. increases) with
consumption variance when p > I (resp. p < 1).
Again, we want to assess the potential welfare  gains of policies that affect both consumption
growth and variance.  More specifically we  assume that once these policies are implemented,
consumption follows the stochastic process (SP  10)
co;Logc, = Logco  +'  t+c'  G'(t)  (SP10)
To  ensure  that  expected  utility  improves  under  (SP 10),  we  assume  that
vs  (co,,"2 ,5,  p,H)  > VS  (Co,,u,  2, p,H).
Proposition 9.  The  welfare gains  rs and  Ps  of policies  that  modify  the stochastic  process
followed  by consumption from (SP9) to (SP  O)  are given by
I(p_  1)2 _(C&2 _  ,2)=  Log  8l-n+(p-1))p'  (21) 2  1  - eIj-+p1)(ur)-
[_/-n+(p-1).  (,++rs)
Log(l+Ps)=  2  (p1)  aZ _s2)+  1  Log  n[p-1(P),p  (22)
Log(1 + ps)  Log(~  a.  +
n+(P-I).  u
Both measures of welfare gains depend on consumption drifts and variances (u, r) and (u',  ')  of
the initial and final stochastic processes respectively and on the time horizon H.  When the drifts
remain  unchanged  (u'=  u),  the  second  term  in Equation  (21)  disappears  and the  measure  Ps  of
12welfare  gains becomes independent of the horizon while the measure  Ts  still depends on  H.
Note thatwhen  /u'=du,  a'=0  and Ps issmall(ps  O),  Log(I+ps)  ps  and
Ps t  2(p-1).(v  a)  (23) 2
which  is  similar  to  the  relation derived  by  Lucas  (1987,  Eq.  (8),  p.26).'4 However,  even
when  ,u  =,  the  measure  rs still  depends  on  the  horizon.  However,  when  H = X  and
(,u',  c')  (u, a),  there exists a closed form solution for rs  given by
12
rs  (u  -P)+  2  '(p-1).(ea2  f2)[fi  n+(p  1) ,]  (24)
Note also that
Eo  [c(l+  p).c11,pa  (t)0(5
Eo [cc. qu,e  (t)]  =1 + PS(25)
where  ccCo,  (t) and  c(i+ps).c,>f  (t)  represent per-capita  consumption under (SP9) and  (SP  10)
respectively.  Consequently, as Lucas mentioned (1987,  p. 25), the  compensating increase  in
current consumption results in an identical increase in expected consumption on all dates and in
all states of nature. However, ps  does generally depend on a number of parameters including the
horizon except when p = ,u which was the case Lucas considered.
Since this model has been used empirically, it is useful to determine the implicit risk-free rate that
corresponds to this economy in order to calibrate the model.
Proposition 10. In this economy, the implicit risk-free interest rate is stochastic with mean
E(R,,,,)=,8-n+p-  P-_  p  cr2  (26) 2~~~~~~~~~~~(6
This  outcome  is  not  surprising.  When  the  contemporaneous  shock  G(t)  is  positive  and
consumption  follows  a  trend-stationary  process,  individuals  expect  future  one-period
consumption to decrease to the trend-level and consequently expected marginal utility to increase.
3.4 Alternative preference
We now  consider Kreps-Porteus preferences, which  allow for  a  separate rate  of relative  risk
aversionp  and  elasticity of intertemporal substitution  -'-.  We assume that  (log  of) per-capita
consumption follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift identical to (SP 1). In this section,
we assume H  = co. The continuous time version of Kreps-Porteus preferences that we consider
implies that U  follows the stochastic integral (Svensson, 1989; Duffie and Epstein, 1989, 1992)
_1  (  __-_n)  c_-_  1  2
dU=  K  LpUca  +-.Pa  .U)  dt+arU.dZ  (SPI 1)
where  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
14  In fact, Lucas found the coefficient (  p - I ) to be p  instead.  We were not able to reconcile this difference.
13Proposition  9.  When  (per-capita)  consumption  follows  Kreps-Porteus  preferences,  expected
utility at time 0 is given by
VKP  (co,,ar  ,n) = [/3-n  ((r-1).  c0 (27)
where
- 1  ~~~~2
2
As mentioned in van Wincoop (1994), note that when  i = p,  and we apply the transformation
U1-P
to utility, this is the same equation as (4) with H =
I-p
We want to assess the potential welfare gains of policies that, once implemented, lead to a change
in the consumption stochastic process to (SP2).
Proposition  12.  The  welfare  gains  r,p  and  pKp  of policies  that  modify  the  stochastic  process
followed  by consumption  from  (SP1) to (SP2) are given by
TUCIP  = i  '-  ,i  (28)
I  ,  - n + y-1.,, 
Log(l +  pKcp)  =  -Log  _6  (29)
yr-l  6-n+(tv-I  .,
Note the analogy with Proposition 2 when y = p.  Under Kreps-Porteus preferences, the measure
r,vp  of welfare gains remains identical to that under CRRA preferences.  It depends only on the
rate of relative risk aversion p  but does not depend on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
H.  However, measure  pKp  of  welfare  gains  does depend on  the  elasticity  of  intertemporal
substitution as well as the risk-aversion coefficient. This result is identical to Obsfeld (1994b),
who derives the measure PKP of welfare gains in a discrete time version of the current model and
concludes  "unless  risk  aversion  and  intertemporal  substitutability  are  carefully  separated,
attempts  to measure  the welfare  costs  of changes in  consumption risk  can yield  misleading
conclusions about the role of risk-aversion." Graph 5 describes measure pKp  of welfare gains as a
function of  yr holding the rate of relative risk aversion constant at 4. Measure  pKP of welfare
gains become smaller if we lower the intertemporal substitution elasticity from 1/4 to  1/10 but
they become much larger if we raise the intertemporal substitution elasticity from 1/4 to 1. These
results are identical those derived in van Wincoop (1994).
Graph  5:  Welfare  gain  and elasticity  of inter-temporal  substitution
Van  Wincoop (1994)  mentions that  using consumption data  for  nineteen US  states, a  point
estimate  of the  elasticity  of intertemporal substitution of  1 is found, with  a  relatively small
standard error of 0.3.  However, note that measure pKP  of welfare gains can be rewritten
Log (I + PKP) =  I  .Lo_  g [I  (  ) A - i).  (30)
which implies
Log (1 + p,)  - n  (31)
yw-*i /1-n(
1 4Consequently, gains from risk sharing as measured by  p,p are very sensitive to the difference
(,8 - n) when tv  tends to 1 which makes it difficult to use this measure to evaluate welfare gains
with precision.
4.  Welfare gains from risk sharing: empirical results
Empirical studies of the welfare gains from international risksharing have used two approaches.
Under  the consumption-based approach, papers  have typically assumed  that  country-specific
(per-capita)  consumption  path  follow exogenously  given  stochastic processes with  identical
means.  This literature assumes that risksharing allow countries to reduce consumption variance
while maintaining the same consumption growth as before risksharing(a'=,u).  Consequently,
this literature has then focused on the question: What are the potential welfare gains of policies
that would reduce the standard deviation of consumption from  a  to  a'  where  co  is derived
from paper-specific consideration. However, the assumption of common consumption growth rate
is at odds with the hypothesis of conditional convergence supported by empirical studies.) 5 The
alternative portfolio-based approach has sought to derive the parameters (,u',a') of consumption
dynamics after risksharing from a partial equilibrium CAPM model. Earlier studies on the gains
from  international risksharing focused on  the  benefits from  diversifying across  international
equity markets  (Grubel,  1968; Levy  and  Sarnat,  1970) while  Shiller (1993) and  Shiller and
Athanasoulis (1997) derive the welfare gains that would result from trading hypothetical country-
specific GDP-linked securities.
The objective of this paper is not to derive (,',a')  from an optimization problem. Instead, it is to
assess the welfare gains from international risksharing using the proposed alternative measure r .
As we have  shown, if (per-capita) consumption dynamics is non-stationary, the measure  r of
risksharing  is robust  to  alternative specifications of preferences (from  constant  relative  risk
aversion  (CRRA) preferences  to  Kreps-Porteus  preferences)  and  stochastic processes  (from
geometric Brownian processes to Orstein-Ulhenbeck mean-reverting processes) for consumption.
It has also the attractive feature of being independent of the horizon. These features are in sharp
contrast with the measure  p previously used in the literature that is sensitive to the horizon and
alternative specifications of utility and stochastic process.
Table 2 shows a literature comparison of welfare gains from risksharing. Assumptions regarding
the stochastic processes and the underlying parameters are taken directly from the papers. Implicit
risk-free interest rates are derived from Proposition 5 when the consumption stochastic process is
assumed to be stationary while for non-stationary processes it is derived from Proposition 10.
Welfare gains are derived using Table 1: the base case scenario corresponds to non-stationary
processes while  alternative 2  corresponds to  stationary processes.  Eventually, we  report  the
measure  p  of  welfare  gains  as  reported  in  the  papers  themselves.  With  the  exception  of
Athanasoulis  and  van  Wincoop  (2000), the  papers that assume non-stationary processes for
consumption report a measure  p  of welfare gains in the range 0.45-2.00 for a ratio of  I to 4
15 For example,  van Wincoop  (1994) who applies this method  to derive welfare  gains notes that can be
achieved  through risksharing among twenty OECD  countries mentions that  average per  capita
consumption  growth ranges from 0.3 percent in Ireland to 4.1 percent in Iceland. To get around  this
problem  van Wincoop  sets ,u' equal  to the unweighted  average  per capita consumption  growth  rate among
the twenty  OECD countries.  See  Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995) for more on conditional convergence.
15between the lowest and highest value.'6 However, had they used the alternative measure  z ,the
same papers would have derived welfare gains in a more marrow range of 0.033-0.072 percent
with an average of  0.05 percent.
Table 2: Welfare gains from riskshari g:  Consumption-based  approach
Lucas  Cole and  Obstfeld  Van  Tesar  Lewis  Athanasoulis and
(1987) 2/  Obstfeld  (1994a)  Wincoop  (1995) 41  (1996)  van Wincoop
1l  (I99  1)3  (1994)  (2000)'
Stochastic process  S  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS
Parameters
u =,u  #0.0300  0.0270  0.0202  0.0170  0  0.0234  0.0187
0.0130  0.0250  0.0163  0.0219  0.0295  0.0191  0.0503
0  0.0199  0  0.0110  0.0172  0.0153  0.0277
p  5  4  4  4  2  5  3
e_18  0.95  0.98  0.95  0.99  0.98  0.98  1.03
n  0  0  0  01  0  0  0
H  oo  50  oo  oo  100  oo  35
Risk-free interest rate
(percent)
R  19.9  12.2  12.9  7.3  1.8  13.2  1.3
R'  _  20.1  12.4  13.2  7.7  1.9  13.4  2.3
Derived welfare gains
(percent)
p  0.034  0.45  0.48  1.22  2.00  0.30  4.62
r  0.0058  0.046  0.053  0.072  0.057  0.033  0.26
Reported welfare gains
(percent)
p  0.042  0.24  0.36  1.30  1.70  0.080  1.52
I/ S: stationary;  NS:  non-stationary
2/ Lucas  uses a different  relation  for p  (See  footnote  11).  We set G(Q)  = 0 to derive  the  risk-free  interest  rate (See  Proposition  9).
31 The  low welfare  gains  derived  by Cole  and  Obstfeld  (1991)  in a two-country  model  is driven  by the specific  four-state  Markov
process  that they  consider.  See  Athanasoulis  and  van Wincoop  (2000)  for more  details.
4/ Tesar (1995) reports jP  (See footnote  9).
5/ Data  correspond  to 21 OECD  countries  (Table  2,  p. 489).
Based on  our previous analysis, we now turn to our own estimates of the welfare  gains from
risksharing for a representative US consumer (Table 3). Empirically, the degree of risk-aversion
is often estimated to be quite small in the range of 2 to 4.17  In this paper, we set p = 3 and take
e-6= 0.98.  From the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston (1991)), we  derive the other
parameters including consumption growth (u = 0.0189)  and variance (a = 0.0157). We assume that
international risksharing results in a complete elimination of consumption volatility  (although
alternative assumptions could be easily worked out). We consider alternative scenarios where
international risksharing does not lead to an increase in consumption growth (Scenario 1) or leads
to 0.5 percent or 1 percent increase (Scenario 2 and 3 respectively). We use the relations reported
in Table  1 (Base  Case) to derive the measure  r of welfare  gains both in percentage points  of
consumption growth and in US dollar equivalent. As Table 3 shows, eliminating all consumption
volatility would represent 0.037 percentage points of consumption growth equivalent to US$12
per annum per person in 1999 to a representative US consumer. This outcome is similar to that
derived by Lucas in  1987 (US$8.50). This is a very small  amount. Consequently, if the  only
benefits brought about by  international risksharing is a decrease in volatility, then  even minor
16 The outcome  of 4.62 reported  by Athanasoulis  and van Wincoop  (2000)  results from an unrealistically
high assumption  for  cr .
17 However, Mehra and Prescott (1985) find that the degree of risk aversion must be large in order to generate a risk
premium on equity returns consistent with US data.
16impediments  to  full  risksharing  can  wipe  out these  small  gains.  However, if  international
risksharing  also  leads  to  an  increase  in consumption growth,  then  Table  2  shows that  any
additional l/2  percent increase  in consumption growth is worth about US$160 per  annum to a
representative US consumer.  Whether this amount is high or low is a matter of judgment (and
personal wealth) but this conclusion clearly shows that what is required to pursue the analysis and
reach  stronger  conclusions  regarding the  benefits  from risksharing  is to  build  a  model  that
endogenizes both initial and final consumption stochastic processes which would allow to derive
(p',  a')  from an individual optimization problem.
Table 3: Welfare gains from risk-sharing (United States)
Parameters":,u=0.0189,  a =0.0157, p=3,  exp(-,6)=0.98,  n=0.0116
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3
Parameters
p  0.0189  0.0239  0.02891
Ca  0  0  0
Risk-free  interest  rate (percent)
R  6.4  6.4  6.4
R'  6.5  8.0  9.5
Welfare  gains (percent)
r (percent)  0.037  0.54  1.04
US$  dollars equivalent (1999)  11.8  171.2  330.6
p(H  = 35)  (percent)  0.48  7.0  13.4
p(H  =  c)  (percent)  0.80  11.1  20.6
1/  Parameters  are  based  on consumption  data  from  Summer  and  Heston  1991  (Penn  World  Tables),  for the  period  1960-1997.
The analysis of the paper would be equally applicable to derive the welfare gains from policies
that affect the growth and variability of consumption born at the individual level in a model with
heterogeneous agents. For example, the standard deviation of annual consumption growth based
on PSID  data seems to be about 30  percent (Altonji and  Siow, 1987). Using the  framework
proposed in this  paper, a complete elimination of this volatility is worth about US$4,400 per
annum to a representative consumer!
5.  Summary and conclusions
This paper examines the welfare gains from risksharing in a  number of different models and
suggests that differences in outcome have  resulted from the use of  a measure which  is very
sensitive to a set of parameters and alternative specifications of utility and stochastic processes
when uncertainty results from non-stationary processes. However, the difference among papers
would not have been so large had the authors used the alternative measure we proposed. Using
the  latter  measure,  the  welfare  gains  that  would  result  from  a  complete  elimination  of
consumption  volatility  do  no  appear  large  enough  to  outweigh  even  small  transaction  or
information costs. However, gains could become substantial if international risksharing also lead
to an increase in consumption growth.
The paper proposed an alternative measure to assess the welfare gains that would result from
adopting policies which modify the (per-capita) consumption stochastic process from (SP I) to
(SP2).  However, the paper has taken both stochastic processes as exogenous. We believe that
future research should seek to apply Merton's (1990) complete-market general equilibrium model
17in  continuous  time  (GEMCT)  to  a  multi-country  framework to  endogenize  the  stochastic
processes.  We  also  believe  that  the  consumption-  and  portfolio-based approaches  can  be
interpreted within Merton's  framework in  which the  continuous-time version of the  Sharpe-
Lintner-Mossin CAPM is obtained. But even if this is done, other questions will remain. First, a
GEMCT would probably assume that all sources of disturbances are country-specific. Domestic
shocks such as monetary or fiscal policy shocks would also need to be considered. Second, a
GEMCT would assume that the production dynamics are observable and cannot be affected by
domestic  policies  or  coalitions  of  countries.  The  assumption  that  individuals  take  the
"production" side of the economy as given would need to be relaxed if countries are able to "self-
insure" by adjusting labor supply, for example. In fact, much research remains to be done to
incorporate human  capital and  incentive in this  framework. 18 Third, the model assumes  that
uncertainties follow a geometric Brownian motion with drift. However, means and variance may
evolve with time. For example, a complete model would have to be consistent with the empirical
findings of conditional convergence.
18 Bodie  et Al (1992)  introduces  labor  in a continuous  time  model.
18Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Per-capita consumption at any time t is given by
_(Ia 2 )t+c{Z  )_Z(O)l
c,  =c  cO  e
Expected utility is
V  o  , ,p,  H ) = Eo  f  en4)'4  dt]
Substituting c, and taking expectations
V(co,,r,5  ,p,H)  = cO  °  e(n-'')t  '  *  dtl-  e  dt
which can be rewritten
2  _p  Ie_[,8-n+(p-1)  ] jH  I  I  e_  e(f-n).H
v (Co' ,  p7,o*  H)=  co1 ~[n(1Pl  _____
I  -p  -n+(p-1)  .ji  I-p  3- n
where
,u--  p_  I  p,a  2
Proof of Proposition 2
1-  -F-H
Define  VF>O  ,VH>0  G(F,H)=-e
Note that  V(cO,IA+',CO2,p,H)=  v(co,=(o  ,a'l2,p,H)H.=>G[F(F +v,p),t]=G[F(jg',p),H]
VH > °; aG (F, H) < 0  implies that G is a strictly decreasing function of F. Hence,
8F
G[Fi+r,p),H1  = G[F(g,  p),H]  z'  F(g  +r, p)=  F(gi', p)  which  implies  r
Proof of Proposition 3
dp  - I  F(ji, p)  F(i  ',P) 
1 dH
1+p  p-I  L  eF(i,p)-H  _  I  eF(  Pp)  _I IJ
By  assumption ,'  > ,  hence  F(,i',  p)>  F(,,  p) (resp. F(/i', p)  < F(g,  p))  when p>i  (resp.
p<1).  The  proposition  results  from  the  fact  that  the  functionf(F)  F  is  strictly
eFHf-
decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 4
19Write  -d  l(F.H+  H)  vdft'  where  F'=F(t,p).  By  assumption,  F'>O.  The
proposition results from  eFiH  > I + F'-  H.
Proof of Proposition 5
Define R,,I+h as the risk-free interest rate (assumed known at time t) during the period [t, t + h].
Euler equation is
du(C,)=,  (R  SI,+h  f)-hE  rdu  (Ct+,h)
dt  dt
which can be rewritten
E, (-)  = e  (R/I+h  )
Then, the proposition directly results from
(1-lz>,)h+e,Z(Q+h)-Z(i)]
Ct+h  =  c,  e
Proof of Proposition 6
Immediate from Equation (13).
Proof of Proposition 7
Immediate.
Proof of Proposition 8
Per-capita consumption at any time t is given by
C, =  C  e-
Expected utility is
V  (Co  o,  &,p  , H)  =  Je('eN  ',  dt]
Substituting c, and taking expectations
Vs(Co,p,  2  , p, H) =_co  -Le(n4l)t. e(  P)pt+(1'P)a  dt
which can be rewritten
v.co  ,.u or&,'P,H)=- co1 I-eL  n+(p-1)-]H  l(pO_)2a2
VS(O9iU5  P  H)  I-p  6-n+(p-_1).  U
Proof of Proposition 9
Immediate using Equation (19).
20Proof of Proposition 10
Follow the proof of Proposition 5 and write
-p c, 
Since G (t) is known a time t
R,,+h =6  -n+p  p - du  - )÷ p+,O  a.
Proof of Proposition 11
Immediate.
Proof of Proposition 12
Immediate.
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